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 Preface 
!
The space of the not yet known exerts a strong desire to know. To know - for instance - why a film that is so 
reluctant to fulfill its hermeneutic promise kept me fascinated for the duration of this writing process. As a pre-
liminary answer to that ultimate question I offer, as preface and afterthought, Agamben's following meditation, 
whose final lines tie a fascinating knot between the affective strength of not knowing, the movement of dance, 
and von Kleist's puppets.	
!
  	

Ook het weten verhoudt zich, in de laatste analyse, tot een niet weten. Maar het doet dat op de wijze van verdringing 
of, efficiënter en sterker, van vooronderstelling. Het niet weten is datgene wat weten veronderstelt als het onontdekte 
land dat er is om veroverd te worden; het onbewuste is het duister waarin het bewuste zijn licht heeft binnen te dra-
gen. In beide gevallen wordt iets gescheiden, om vervolgens doordrongen en herenigd te worden.	

De relatie tot een zone van niet weten echter waakt over datgene wat blijft als het is. Niet om de obscuriteit ervan te 
exalteren, zoals de mystiek doet, noch om het verborgene te verheerlijken, zoals de liturgie doet. Evenmin om haar te 
vullen met fantasmen, zoals de psychoanalyse doet. Het gaat niet om een geheime leer of een hogere wetenschap, 
noch om een weten dat zichzelf niet kent. Het is mogelijk dat de zone van niet weten in feite niets bijzonders bevat; 
dat, als het mogelijk zou zijn erin te kijken, wij slechts - maar zeker is dit niet - een oud, achtergelaten sleetje zouden 
vinden, niet meer - maar duidelijk is dit niet - dan het uitdagende gebaar van een meisje dat ons uitnodigt om te spe-
len. Misschien bestaat er zelfs geen zone van niet weten, bestaan er alleen haar gestes. Zoals Kleist zo goed begreep is 
de relatie tot een zone van niet weten een dans. (Agamben 185) 	
i!!!
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!
 Introduction !
This thesis is the result of my attempt to read and interpret BEING JOHN MALKOVICH (Jonze, 1999).	
!
Three scenes of this film present itself to me as a tripartite mise-en-abyme. For the sake of simplicity I will offer 
a loose definition: the mise-en-abyme is a miniature of the work, contained by the work itself (in chapter 5 I will 
do more justice to the complexity of this figure in a discussion involving the commentaries of Gide, Dällenbach, 
Bal, and Ron on the subject). My analysis started as a loose attempt to justify and substantiate my intuition that 
the opening scene of the film – featuring a puppet executing a choreography titled ‘Dance of Despair and Disil-
lusionment’ – is a miniature version of the whole film.This analysis did not work well as a result of my failure to 
grasp the film’s meaning in a satisfying totality. I could not find an answer – both satisfactory and comprehensive 
enough – to the questions: “What is this film about?” 	
!
On the one hand, the mise-en-abyme extends a serious hermeneutical promise, the fulfillment of which, howe-
ver, is actively prevented by the film's ironically playful whole. So far, my formal analysis did not seem to resona-
te with the temporary stability of meaning that is promised by Frans-Willem Korsten’s definition of the mise en 
abyme:	
!
“Niet elk onderdeel leent zich daarvoor [lezing als mise en abyme, JK]. Je weet eigenlijk pas welk onderdeel rele-
vant is, wanneer je de gehele tekst hebt gelezen. Je kunt dan pas proberen deel en geheel aan elkaar te relateren. 
Dat lukt nooit na één lezing , want elke herlezing leidt tot herziening. Zodoende ontstaat er een dialectisch proces. 
Wanneer je erin slaagt een betekenisvolle synthese te vinden tussen deel en geheel, stopt dat proces tijdelijk. 
Door deze dynamiek is mise en abyme in het Postmodernisme een populair vormgevend principe 
geworden.” (198)  	
ii!
I found myself increasingly frustrated by the film’s many ironies, by its endless self-reflexivity, and the plotlines 
that simply would not integrate into a comprehensive narrative. These aspects of the film put me on the trail of 
Paul de Man's analysis of an old German Romantic text about puppetry, also a dominant theme in Malkovich. 
Whilst increasing my understanding of how the film worked to emphasize the impossibility of attributing a sin-
gle meaning, it did not help me in any way to come to a satisfactory interpretation of the mise-en-abyme. In 
order to work with that hermeneutic promise I needed to read up on hermeneutics. Which is what I did. 	
!
Chapters 1 functions as a general introduction to  this foray into Gadamer's hermeneutics and its negative; Paul 
de Man's deconstruction. These two methods are discussed in depth in chapters 2 and 3, and subjected to a 
comparative analysis in chapter 4. The combined insights of that last chapter form the theoretical backdrop for 
my discussion of the mise-en-abyme in BEING JOHN MALKOVICH (chapter 5). In the conclusion I will begin with a 
reflection on my own reading process ('what kept me enticed?'), before briefly summarizing the insights and 
observations gained from writing this thesis. 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 I chose the Dutch translation because the possessive pronouns in the penultimate sentence ('haar gestes') refer in i
Dutch both to the little girl and the zone of nonknowledge, and because it was in this language that it struck me in the 
middle of my writing process with a chance reference to Kleist, both unexpected, enlightening, and puzzling: an invita-
tion to play. Translation from English publication (listed in bibliography): Even knowledge, in the final analysis, main-
tains a relationship with ignorance. But it does so through repression or, in an even more effective and potent way, pre-
supposition. The unknown is that which knowledge presupposes as the unexplored country to be conquered; the un-
conscious is the darkness into which consciousness will have to carry its light, In both cases something gets separated 
in order to then be permeated and attained. The relationship with a zone of nonknowledge, on the other hand, keeps 
watch over this zone so that it will remain as is. This is done not by exalting its darkness (as in mysticism), not by glori-
fying the arcane (as in liturgy), and not even by filling it with phantasms (as in psychoanalysis)). At issue here is not a 
secret doctrine or a higher science, nor a knowledge we do not know. Rather, it is possible that the zone of non knowl-
edge does not really contain anything special at all, that if one could look inside of it, one would only glimpse - though 
this is not certain - an old and abandoned sled, only glimpse - though this is not clear - the petulant hinting of a little 
girl inviting us to play. Perhaps a zone of nonknowledge does not exist at alle; perhaps only its gestures exist. As Kleist 
understood so well, the relationship with a zone of non knowledge is a dance. 
!  Not each part of the text is suitable [for a reading as mise en abyme, JK]. You can only really know which part is releii -
vant, once you have read the entire text. Only then can you try to relate the part to the whole. This never works after 
just one read, since every re-reading leads to a revision. As such a dialectical process follows. When you succeed at 
vinden a meaningful synthesis between part and whole, this process is temporarily suspended. Because of this dynamic 
movement the mise en abyme has become a popular organizing principle in postmodernism. (translation mine, JK)
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1 Two Modes of Reading 
!
In order to introduce the reading methods of Gadamer and de Man, I will expound here on two analogous 
examples of how Gadamer and de Man tackle an interpretive problem. As typical examples I have chosen two 
cases involving a choice between reading the meaning of a phrase or sentence literally or figuratively. Gadamer 
responds to this problem by trying to stabilize his choice in the semantic context, and thus to legitimate his 
choice for a literal of figurative reading. De Man on the other hand is not afraid to take seriously alle the possi-
ble readings, even if - or particularly if, as in the example cited below - one of the two readings is explicitly war-
ranted. This is where a distinction between Gadamer en de Man becomes clear in terms of their objective: Ga-
damer's objective is semantic: he wants to understand what the text means (to say), and assumes the presence 
of such a meaning. De Man's objective is semiotic: he wants to understand how the signs in a given text signify, 
and in the case of rhetorical figures (such as metaphor, symbol, metonymy) his aim is t know how these figures 
proliferate meaning, and how these meanings contradict each other. In the following example of de Man reading 
the last lines of a famous poem by W.B. Yeats, this rhetorical aspect of his method becomes clear : he questions 
the degree to which we, as readers, can decide between the literal meaning of a phrase, and its rhetorical mea-
ning. 	
!
! O chestnut tree, great rooted blossom	

	
 Are you the leaf, the blossom or the bole?	

	
 O body swayed to music, O brightening glance	

	
 How can we know the dancer from the dance?‑ 	
iii!
A more extended reading, always assuming that the final line is to be read as a rhetorical question, reveals that the 
thematic and rhetorical grammar of the poem yields a consistent reading that extends from the first line to the last 
and that can account for all the details in the text. It is equally possible, however, to read the last line literally rather 
than figuratively, as asking with some urgency the question we asked at the beginning of this talk within the context of 
contemporary criticism: not that sign and referent are so exquisitely fitted to each other that all difference between 
them is at times blotted out but, rather, since the two essentially different elements, sign and meaning, are so intricately 
intertwined in the imagined "presence" that the poem addresses, how can we possibly make the distinctions that 
would shelter us from from the error of identifying what cannot be identified. (de Man Semiology 30)	
!
We can see here quite clearly that against a very clear semantic intention, de Man is prepared to read a rheto-
rical question literally. Gadamer would have wanted to retain the autonomy and self-sufficiency of the relation 
between poetics and meaning. For de Man it is exactly this self-sufficiency that he wants to question. The 
example of Yeats's poem is carefully chosen because it thematizes 'the possibility of convergence between ex-
periences of consciousness such as memory or emotion - what the poem calls passion, piety and affection - 
and entities accessible to the senses such as bodies, persons or icons.' (ibid.) It is exactly the belief in the possi-
bility of such a convergence, between the visible signs of language (accessible to the senses) and the experien-
ces of consciousness that makes up the backbone of Gadamer's mode of reading. This means that Gadamer 
asks a different question than de Man. De Man suspiciously asks: "can we really know what is meant here?", finds 
the answer undecidable and decides to shift to: "how is meaning produced here?", to zoom into a confrontation 
between a literal and a figurative reading. Gadamer on the other hand asks the question: "can we understand 
what is meant here?" As conditions for answering the questions he posits the requirement that the text (and in 
a wider sense, the artwork) is self-sufficient and autonomous. In other words, Gadamer wants a unity in which 
all the poetical aspects, all the signs are geared towards the transmission of 'an experience of consciousness," to 
use de Man's phrase.	

	
 As such, Gadamer would probably object to de Man's reading of Yeats that the final sentence's rhetori-
cal "meaning" as de Man calls it, is not the same as the intended meaning, and rather a function of the text as 
communication effort. The rhetorical function of the text works to stabilize (as a self-sufficient, and as such au-
tonomous context) the transmission of meaning. This is Gadamer's requirement of the truly aesthetic text. Such 
a text works to establish a language situation between the text and its readership, which is based not on suspi-
cious questioning, but on the assumption of good will on the part of the author, and the autonomy of the work: 
so there would be no need to connect the work to larger ideological questions, if there was no explicit refe-
rence, if the ideological question is as such, not thematized by the poetic functions of the text. This is not to say 
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that for Gadamer meaning is stable, meaning is the result of the temporary suspension of the dialogue that is 
continuously going on with the historically situated reader, who as such has historically informed preconceptions 
('oordelen-vooraf') which will evolve throughout history. (Wijzenbroek 22) 	

	
 As an example I will now discuss Gadamer's reading of a crucial phrase in a poem by Mörike. The 
poem describes a beautifully adorned lamp, which hangs in a quiet abandoned room.‑  	
iv!
The line reads: "Was aber schön ist, selig scheint es in ihm selbst." […] I am interested here only as an exemplary case. 
In this verse on encounters two apparently trivial and commonplace words:  "scheint es." This can be understood in 
the sense of "anscheinend" [apparently], dokei [Greek: it appears], "videtur" [Latin], "il semble" [French], "it seems," 
"pare" [Italian], and so forth. This prosaic understanding of the phrase makes sense and and for this reason it has found 
its defenders. But one also notices that it does not obey the law of verse [Gesetz des Verses]. This will allow us to 
show why "scheint es" here means "it shines," or "splender" [Latin, radiates]. In this case, a hermeneutical principle can 
be applied: In vases of conflict [bei Anstöße] the larger context should decide the issue. Every double possibility of 
understanding, however, is an offense [Anstoß][emphasis mine, JK]. Here it is decisively evident that the word beautiful 
in the line is applied to a lamp. That is what the poem as a whole is asserting and is a message that should be under-
stood throughout the poem. A lamp that does not light up any more because it has become an old-fashioned and 
bygone thing hanging in a "Lustgemach" [pleasure room] ("Who notices it now?"), here gains its own brightness becau-
se it is a work of art. (Text 50)	
!
A number of aspects of Gadamer's hermeneutical method become quite clear here. I would like to point out 
some of the consequences for his particular conception of language that are present in this short fragment of 
poetry analysis. First, there is the implicit idea that a number of similar words from different languages can func-
tion as timeless synonyms. It is not that Gadamer simply ignores the subtle differences that might occur bet-
ween the respective meanings of these words, but he starts from the assumption that it is well possible to distill 
the essence of the other person's communicative intention. From this it follows that words can, in essence, be 
synonymous.  From such a perspective it becomes also quite clear how Gadamer frames his 'law of the verse.' v
In chapter 2, dealing with Gadamer's theatrical metaphor for the essence of aesthetic being, I will come to 
speak of his notion of the autonomy of the artwork. This is already present here: the hermeneutical interpreter 
needs to respect 'the law of the verse,' which means that the work itself creates its own context in reference to 
which interpretive uncertainties ought to be stabilized.  It is always in reference to this context, that a work 
ought to be interpretable, and as such this requirement functions as a criterium for aesthetic being (which Ga-
damer is in the process of defining, in his theatrical metaphor). In chapter 2 I will elaborate on this metaphor, 
but it is important to take note here that the metaphor is a visual description of the relationship that inheres 
ideally between artwork and addressee. The artwork is like a theatre play, in that it addresses itself to an au-
dience, whilst promising the possibility of being understood through its unity between structure and meaning 
(much like W.B. Yeats's dancer). For Gadamer, the whole notion of consciously reading the meaning of a word 
differently than what it obviously appears to mean is a breach of this autonomy, this unity. He assumes a a rela-
tionship of trust between reader and work, which works as a double bind: the literary work does not function 
through irony, is not secretly ideological, but is an aesthetic structure which provides a meaningful experience. 
On the other hand, the reader does not take liberties, such as those Paul de Man takes. I will now proceed to 
use an important literary analytical tool - the notion of the language situation - to frame the difference bet-
ween Gadamer and de Man as differently envisioned relations between the work's spokesperson, and her ad-
dressee.	
!
1.! Language Situation // Mode of Address	

Van Alphen explains in Op Poetische Wijze that every instance of language can be read as taking place within a 
particular language situation. The easiest way to explain what he means is to say that every text creates more 
or less implicitly a virtual space within which the utterance takes place. This situation or space is immanent in 
the text, so it is quite explicitly not a description of the communicative transaction between the sender and 
receiver of the text (say the author and the reader of a book). Rather, it concerns the communicative transacti-
on between what he terms the 'spokesman' (woordvoerder) of the text and addressee. The subtle difference 
here becomes very clear in the language situation of the lyric, characterized as an apostrophe by van Alphen, in 
reference to Northrop Frye's Anatomy of Criticism. What this particular language situation boils down to, is 
that the lyrical subject (the poem's spokesman, or -woman) addresses an entity other than the reader, who is as 
such witness to the utterance from behind the back of the lyrical subject.  The addressee can be a range of 
agents: abstract ideas (inspiration), divine entities, a lover. This situation is immanent in the text - and can be in-
ferred by asking of the text the questions "who speaks?" and "to whom?" 	
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 In the study of literary texts van Alphen makes a distinction between the lyric, the dramatic, and the 
narrative language situation. It is not my point here to make an exhaustive range: what I wish to point out is that 
it is crucial to realize that any text implicates a particular relation between the spokesperson and the addressee. 
This is important because the two thinkers that make up the theoretical framework of this thesis (Gadamer & 
de Man) have two radically different conceptions of what it means to interpret a work, and this is manifest in 
their respective conceptions of the language situation between spokesperson and addressee. They are funda-
mentally divided on the question of both the basis and the nature of this relationship: for Gadamer the aesthe-
tic is defined as a very particular language situation (the nature of which he defines through the metaphor of 
the theatre, cf. chapter 2), which ensures the possibility of meaning, the transaction of which can then proceed 
on a basis of good will between performer and audience. De Man, on the other hand, does not seek to define 
the aesthetic by the yardstick of a particular language situation, but is interested in the way the artefact's imma-
nent language situation is conflictual with the meaning it supposedly produces (in chapter 3 I will discuss an 
example of this). 	

	
 In chapter 2 I will work out how Gadamer envisions a relationship between the artwork and its au-
dience in a theatrical metaphor. In Chapter 3 it will become clear that for de Man the language situation could 
never be captured in a single metaphor, because for him each text constructs its own particular language situa-
tion, which relates to a mode of knowledge production. De Man distinguishes, for instance, between the way a 
dramatic situation lays claim to truth and the way lyric does this. In the case of a dramatic language situation this 
claim is substantiated, so argues de Man, on the basis of mimesis or semblance. De Man observes that in the 
text by von Kleist he discusses, a semblance of plausibility is created by the dramatic dialogue in which  persua-
sion takes place. De Man focuses not on what is said on the diegetical level, but how the language situation itself 
works to persuade the reader. The fact that one of the actors in the language situation is persuaded by the 
other, leads to a greater semblance of plausibility. 	

	
 The differences between these two modes of reading will inform my analysis of BEING JOHN MALKO-
VICH in chapter 5, by supplying me with different sorts of questions one can ask of an artwork. Working from a 
hermeneutical perspective we are invited to look for what the work tries to tell us. We work from the trust 
that the aesthetic structure is in and of itself meaningful. This mode of questioning allows one to stick close to 
the direct experience of the artwork: even if it is fraught with irony, parody and self-reference. De Man's set of 
questions allow us to look into the particular relationship the work constructs between itself and its readership: 
this leads me, as a reader, away from the direct experience of the work, to a 'meta-analysis' of how the work 
plays with its own status as artwork, its very credibility. As such it leads to a typically postmodern reading of the 
film's emphatic instability of meaning. In chapter 5 and the conclusion I will also address how the two different 
approaches - although seemingly opposed - can work with and through one another in a final analysis of how 
the film invites both Gadamer's hermeneutical, and de Man's deconstructionist  approach.	
!
!  No reference supplied in source text, other than the title and author of the poem. W.B. Yeats first published this iii
poem, "Among School Children," in The Tower, in 1928. 
!  Entire poem supplied in source text, p298. iv
!  This notion of the essence of different words also returns in chapter 3: note 4, when we find that Gadamer, in his v
discussion the the theatre play, distills the essence of the word 'play' from the variety of its meanings and usages. 
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2  Gadamer's Theatrical Metaphor 
!
In this chapter I will try to find out how the various aspects of his theatrical metaphor reflect on what Gada-
mer wants to define as aesthetic ontology (i.e. the mode of being of art, or artifacts) and the hermeneutical 
model.  We will find out that Gadamer's metaphor envisages an ideal language situation in which a transaction 
of meaning can take place between performance and audience. The possibility of this transaction (from perfor-
mance to interpretation) is based on the trusting presupposition that there is nothing outside of the aesthetic 
structure that the audience requires to experience meaning. This notion of aesthetic autonomy and the ideal of 
communication of meaning, as developed in Gadamer's metaphor are particularly enlightening with regard to 
de Man's thinking, because for him the structure is never autonomous, but always intertwined in a societal, his-
torical, and necessarily ideological context, thus making any notion of autonomy very problematic, resulting in a 
suspicious stance towards Gadamer's hermeneutics - with its ideal of autonomy. I will discuss these differences 
between Gadamer and de Man in depth in Chapter 4: "Comparing Textual Models." 	
!
1.  From Play to Art 
Gadamer discusses a number of essential aspects of play and games, which bound together in the theatre play 
allow it to cross the threshold into becoming a metaphor for aesthetic being. In reference to the difference I 
just referred to between Gadamer and de Man I address here first one general aspect of play, which Gadamer 
takes as exemplary for the artwork's autonomy. This is what he terms the primacy of the play over the players, 
and it is a point he develops by starting with the etymology of the verb 'to play.'  	
vi!
If we examine how the word 'play' is used and concentrate on its so-called transferred meanings, we find talk of the 
play of light, the play of the waves, the play of a component in a bearing-case, the inter-play of limbs, the play of forces, 
the play of gnats, even a play on words. In each case what is intended is the to-and-fro movement which is not tied to 
any goal which would bring it to an end. (Truth 93)	
!
In the different usages of the word play Gadamer points to the aspect of autonomy that is the common deno-
minator. The play is not determined by the players, but it is a particular movement which is inherently indepen-
dent and repeatable. "It is the game that is played - it is irrelevant whether or not there is a subject who plays. The 
play is the performance of the movement as such." (ibid.) What this means for the theatrical metaphor is that the 
theatre is seen as such an independent and repeatable structure, and that as such it has an autonomy; as Ga-
damer says it, the play has 'primacy over the players.' (ibid. 95) This translates into an ideal of total mediation, in 
demanding complete disappearance of the identity of the players:	
!
Play itself is, rather, transformation of such a kind that the identity of the player does not continue to exist for any-
body. Everybody asks instead what it is supposed to be, what is 'meant.' The players (or poets) no longer exist, but 
only what of theirs is played. (ibid. 100)	
!
The convergence of different aspects of general play into the particular form of theatrical play is the develop-
ment he refers to in the following, crucial fragment which further emphasizes the importance of the notion of 
structure. "I call this development, in which play finds its true perfection in being art, 'the transformation into 
structure.' Only through this development does play acquire its ideality, so that it can be intended and understood as 
play" (ibid. 99) What becomes very clear here is that Gadamer, in developing an aesthetic philosophy,  is positing 
a selective criterium (what is art and what isn't?) on the basis of the willingness to be 'intended and under-
stood as play.'  This means that the play is meaningful in and of itself, which I referred to above as its autonomy, vii
while simultaneously the play is dependent on being performed, being played:	
!
Play is structure - this means that despite its dependence on being played it is a meaningful whole which can be 
repeatedly represented as such and the significance of which can be understood. But the structure is also play, 
because - despite this theoretical unity - it achieves its full being only each time it is played. (ibid. 105)	
!
This double bind between play and structure is crucial in grasping that hermeneutical understanding takes place 
as an event, in the experience of the text. This reflects Gadamer's phenomenological outlook, and his emphasis 
on the experiential aspect of the aesthetic is further confirmed by the notion of the structure's autonomy. The 
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performance ought not to attract attention to itself, the meaning passes through the experience of the perfor-
mance, and the aesthetic structure is different from other structures in that the procedure it prescribes (as a 
choreography) is fitted to transmit the meaningful experience of human consciousness. In other words, there is 
a unity between poetics (the structure of the work) and its hermeneutics (the meaning of the work).  
‑ 	
viii!
"Thus the concept of transformation characterizes the independent and superior mode of being of what we called 
structures. From this viewpoint 'reality' is defined as what is untransformed, and art as the raising up of this reality 
into its truth. (ibid. 102)	
!
2. Understanding the Human Condition 
What this unity between poetics and hermeneutics safeguards is the work's capacity of being understood, it 
promises the possibility of the transmission of meaning. What this means becomes clear once we try to answer 
the questions of the subject or theme of art: what is it that gets transformed into structure, what is the work 
about? For Gadamer this can be only one thing, even though it is very large and hard to define: the human 
condition. To understand what he means by this it is good to keep in mind that Gadamer works within the phi-
losophical tradition of phenomenology, which strives to understand and describe the experience of being (hu-
man). This activity of understanding of the human being and its position in the world, vis-a-vis community, histo-
ry, death, is what Gadamer calls hermeneutics. !
The ability to understand is a fundamental endowment of man, one that sustains communal life with others and, 
above all, one that takes place by way of language and the partnership of conversation. In this respect the universal 
claim of hermeneutics is beyond doubt. (Text 21)	
!
What this means for our topic here - understanding Gadamer's theatrical metaphor - is that hermeneutics, or 
acts of interpretation are everywhere. Meaning, experience of the human condition, and acts of trying to un-
derstand this - or, hermeneutics - are inextricably bound together. As a 'fundamental endowment of man,' her-
meneutics is the cognitive activity in which humans continuously engage, hence the 'universal claim.' This notion 
makes its way into the metaphor of the theatre as the requirement that there is a continuity between the 
world presented on the stage, and the essence of the lifeworld of the audience. Staying within the metaphor 
and taking tragedy as our example: what the playwright does is to capture the tragic aspects from the big chao-
tic world, and rework these aspects into a structure, which can be repeatedly performed: a tragic play. Examples 
of such universal thematics would be the confrontation between protagonists and death, the machinations of 
higher forces, meaningful relationships, life-events.	
!
The spectator recognizes himself and his own finiteness in the face of the power of fate. […] The tragic emotion is 
not a response to the tragic course of events as such or the justice of the fate that overtakes the hero, but to the 
metaphysical order of being that is true for all. To see that 'this is how it is' is a kind of self-knowledge for the specta-
tor, who emerges with new insight from the illusion in which he lives. (Gadamer Truth 117)	
!
What is key here is to note that this is an act 'recognition,' which emphasizes a degree of familiarity, between 
my condition and that of Antigone or Oedipus. This familiarity, this re-cognition, must thus be based on an as-
sumption of universal (both timeless and shared by all of) humanity. For Gadamer, what secures the sustained 
fascination of the tragedy are the manifold ways in which there can be given expression to this self-knowledge, 
which 'deepens the spectator's continuity with himself' (ibid.). This expression takes place through language, and 
rather than think of language as a transparent medium to express these metaphysical issues as clearcut messa-
ges, Gadamer rather emphasizes that the inherent difficulty of this act of expression accounts for the enduring 
mystery of art. The inherent limitations of language (for instance, in giving expression to the realization of one's 
mortality, or the difficulties of truly understanding another human being) are so fundamental for Gadamer, be-
cause he conceives of language as a human being's sole access to the world and the others inhabiting it.	
!
On the other hand, however, the linguisticality of the event of agreement in understanding [Verständigungsversche-
hen], which is in play between people, signifies nothing less than an insurmountable barrier, the metaphysical signifi-
cance of which was also evaluated positively for the first time by German romanticism. [… For] the romantic con-
sciousness it meant that language never touches upon the last, insurmountable secret of the individual person. (Text 
21-2)	
!
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The repeated use of terms connoting limitations (insurmountable, barrier, secret) underline Gadamer's sense of 
awareness of limitations that to him are part of the human condition. The reason that literary texts and inter-
pretation are so crucial becomes clear now: for Gadamer the literary (as an instance of the aesthetic) is under-
stood as attempts to fix in written words a lingual attempt to deal with the human condition within the univer-
se. As such the literary is not so much about metaphysical limitations inherent in language, but it is itself an in-
stance of running up against such limitations, whilst accepting this as a given of the human condition. Herme-
neutics as practicing humanity. It is important to include this insight in my discussion of Gadamer's aesthetic, 
because over and against de Man it is seductive to think of Gadamer as naive in his trust in art as communicati-
on of meaning. But I would argue that rather than think of it in terms of it solely in terms of suspicion, trust and 
naivety, the respective philosophical frameworks should be taken into account to broaden the basis for under-
standing the origins of the differences. For indeed, here lies a crucial difference with de Man. Whereas for him 
the epistemological limitations of language are a lamentable source of mystification, misunderstanding, misrepre-
sentation, and multi-interpretability, for Gadamer the inadequacy of language is simply a given fact of the human 
condition - and one that accounts for the necessity of interpretation, the mystery of the beautiful. He accepts a 
certain undecidability of meaning, and moreover, in his view de Man's epistemological doubts (based on his ne-
arly mechanical semiotic focus) pale by comparison to the meaning of the experience of, for instance, our very 
mortality. 	
!
The Being-toward-the-text from which I took my orientation is certainly no match for the radicality of the limit 
experience found in Being-toward-death, and just as little does the never fully answerable question of the meaning 
of art, or the meaning of history as that which happens to us, signify a phenomenon that is as primordial as the 
question put to human Dasein of its own finitude. (Gadamer 1989, 26)	
!
For Gadamer it is thus the value of the aesthetic, that it enables the audience to experience the limits of the 
human condition. This transmission of experience already suggests the importance of the audience in Gada-
mer's aesthetic ontology. In fact, the assignment of the structure to an audience is 'constitutive of the being of 
art.' 	
!
A religious rite and a play in a theatre obviously do not represent in the same sense as the playing child. Their 
being is not exhausted by the fact that they represent; at the same time they point beyond themselves to the au-
dience which is sharing in them. Play here is no longer the mere self-representation of an ordered movement, nor 
mere representation, in which the playing child is totally absorbed, but it is 'representing for someone.' This as-
signment in all representation comes to the fore here and is constitutive of the being of art. (Gadamer 1979, 97)	
!
The spectator is the focal point in which the play reaches its ideality as metaphor for Gadamer's aesthetic onto-
logy. This allows us to return to the question of Gadamer's particular language situation, and answer more fully 
the question of what . He differs from van Alphen in that behind the concrete language situation of the given 
artwork there is, in essence, always the same mode of address, assignment to the audience, which is 'constitutive 
of the being of art.' The opposite holds true too, if an 'artwork' deviates from this mode of address it will not be 
considered proper art by Gadamer. A good example of this is his notion of the pseudo text, which he coins in 
"Text and Interpretation." Through this notion Gadamer speaks out firmly against the work having an external 
goal-orientedness (the transmission of accidental knowledge, the reference to communicative circumstance 
through irony, ideological slant, etc…).  All events that are not structured autonomously, for instance an ideolo-
gical pamphlet (which is geared towards persuasion), an instruction manual (which transmits information rather 
than universal humanist truths), a joke (ex-/inclusion of those who (don't) understand), are not categorized as 
aesthetic - because they possess a goal-orientedness which lies outside of the transmission of universal truths 
of human experience.	
!
3. Conclusion 
For Gadamer art expresses a universal truth of the human condition. This truth takes the shape of a structure 
(a choreography, a score, a play) which can be performed so as to create a situation of direct address to an 
audience. Gadamer's ideal language situation takes shape as a performative event. The structure of the play is 
autonomous in essence; as it demands submission of the players, but it must be played to come into its ideality; 
so in practice it is also dependent on the players. This is a double bind in which the play takes primacy over the 
players. This autonomy also translates into self-sufficiency, which means that understanding is independent of 
external references, and that one may assume that all interpretive difficulty should be resolved in reference to 
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the work's own context, or the 'law of the verse.' (cf. chapter 1) With all this in mind, there is an ideal unity 
between the meaning and the structure.	
!
"what we have called a structure is one insofar as it presents itself as a meaningful whole." (1979, 106) !
!  For Gadamer the multiplicity of a word's meanings are no reason for alarm - in contradistinction to his deconstrucvi -
tionist contemporaries, among whom Paul de Man. They do not destabilize the meaning of a word, quite the opposite: 
the proliferation of metaphorical meanings are for Gadamer an aspect of language which helps conceptual thinking: 
"If a word is applied to a sphere to which it did not originally belong, the actual original meaning emerges quite clear-
ly. Language has performed in advance a work of abstraction which is, as such, the task of conceptual analysis. Now 
thinking needs only to make use of this advance (sic) achievement." (Gadamer 1979, 92)
!  This implies that there might be many exceptions to this rule, and in the text "Text and Interpretation" he indeed vii
defines many types of text ('pseudo-texts') which for some reason do not measure up to this ideality. 
!  We will return to this unity in our discussion of de Man, whose criticism of the hermeneutical model is aimed at viii
this notion of unity between poetics and meaning. 
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3 De Man's Formalization	
!
In contrast to Gadamer's aesthetic of unity, de Man posits a wholly different notion of the aesthetic. To illustrate 
this I will be discussing a chapter from his book The Rhetoric of Romanticism, titled “Aesthetic Formalization”. This 
text is a discussion of Kleist’s "Über das Marionettentheater." In the introduction of this chapter he quotes a 
fragment from a text by Friedrich Schiller, who sketches an English dance - with its complex, strictly patterned 
choreography, which keeps the dancers from bumping into each other - as the perfect metaphor for the aes-
thetic society: 'the perfect symbol of one's own individually asserted freedom as well as of one's respect for the free-
dom of the other.'  (Schiller qtd in TeFormalization 263) This perfect unity, between choreography and aesthetic ix
grace - a unity which, as we have seen in the Yeats example, is anything but evident for de Man, though exem-
plary for Gadamer's ideal - is exemplary for 'the tautology of art,' in tthe words of Schillers translators. They 
designate with this a capacity in art which is - like that unity - strongly reminiscent of Gadamer's universal, hu-
manist approach to the meaning of art as the truth of human experiences: "its (i.e. 'art', JK) tendency to offer a 
hundred different treatments of the same subject, to find a thousand different forms of expression for the thoughts 
and feelings common to all men."  (Wilkinson & Willoughby qtd in Formalization 264) Juxtaposing these notions x
de Man makes a very concise analysis of the possibly tense relationship between an all-embracing humanism, 
and the ideal of aesthetic unity, expressed in the notion of tautology. Reflecting on the notion of thoughts and 
feelings common to all men he observes of this aesthetic ideal:	
!
"As the privileged and infinitely varied mode of expression of this universality, art is in fact what defines humanity 
in the broadest sense. Mankind, in the last analysis, is human only by ways of art. On the other hand, as a principle 
of formalization rigorous enough to produce its own codes and systems of inscription tautology functions as a 
restrictive coercion that allows only for the reproduction of its own system, at the exclusion of all others." (Forma-
lization 265)	
!
The restrictive coercion that de Man refers to must be understood within a somewhat larger frame, of which 
the notion of rhetorical tautology is exemplary. Considering de Man's emphasis on the undecidable meaning of 
the sign - which we found already in his reading of Yeats - it is not surprising to find him in opposition to the 
notion of a double sign (the tautology) in which the two separate signs designate exactly the same thing. To 
load the expectation on art, that it functions in optima forma as a tautology, is to submit it to an ideology which 
is in direct conflict with what I conceive to be de Man's primary semiological axiom. Although he never states 
explicitly, I paraphrase it as follows: no sign means the same as another, in fact, no sign means the same as itself, 
twice. 	

	
 In direct opposition to the tautological conception of art's universality, de Man posits an aesthetic of 
disagreement, based on his typical approach, which I will discuss below. I will look into a concrete example, 
which is also thematically close to BEING JOHN MALKOVICH, namely de Man's analysis of von Kleist's text on the 
puppet theatre. My reading of this reading will take a few steps. First I will illustrate how de Man - in contrast to 
Gadamer - works from the presupposition that each text constructs its own particular language situation bet-
ween textual agent (the narrator, the lyrical subject, the embodiment of the textual voice) and addressee. In 
Kleist's text, de Man analyses, there is a blend between the narrative and dramatic language situation. Secondly, I 
will address how de Man distinguishes between different textual models on the basis of this particular language 
situation. For de Man, the textual model relates to the question of how a textual object forges a connection 
between the aesthetic and the epistemological: how does the aesthetically pleasant produce truth? In the case 
of the Kleist text this leads him to analyse how the aesthetic aspects of narrative (a well constructed story, a 
reliable narrator), and drama (a scene of persuasion, rather than persuasion itself) leads to a greater sense of 
credibility and plausibility, whereas these might not be warranted, for he disagrees strongly with the theses the 
text endorses. This is where we come to the core of de Man's critique of a hermeneutic reading of Kleist: ac-
cording to him it ignores the way in which this particular language situation, with its appearance of plausibility, 
might conceal dubious truth claims. 	
!!
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1. Articulation of the Aesthetic with the Epistemological 
De Man's approach becomes already quite clear when in the introduction he describes the text of Kleist as 
being concerned with an ‘articulation [in the transitive sense of the word articulate: to forge a connection] of 
the aesthetic with the epistemological. ’ (Formalization 267) The fragment in which he further elaborates this xi
notion is worth quoting in full:	
!
In the Kleist text, however, we are dealing, from the start, with the compatibility of narrative (which is aesthetic) 
with epistemological argument, or, to be somewhat more specific, with the possibility of a system of formalization 
that narrative and argument share in common. (ibid. 273) [italics mine, JK]	
!
De Man observes in the case of the Kleist text that it is a series of three short narratives which are embedded 
in the dramatic situation of two interlocutors having a discussion or argument about the aesthetic grace of 
puppets (which they harmoniously judge to be superior to that of human dancers). His basic question here is 
thus, whether the formal characteristics of narrative (which, he points out, is also aesthetic in nature) can be 
merged with the formal characteristics of an argument (which is obviously epistemological, concerned with the 
finding of knowledge or truth). 	

	
 What de Man sets out to do in the first instance of his analysis, is to point out that while most critics of 
Kleist have taken "Marionettentheater" to be a text with a clear thesis (that puppets possess more grace as 
dancers than their human counterparts), they were misguided to buy into this ‘enclave of familiarity.’ (268) This 
enclave refers to a commonplace within the Romantic worldview, in which the puppet (as metaphor) takes 
centre stage of discussions about determinism and artistic genius that typify Enlightenment and Romantic thin-
king. It is indeed so that in the text two interlocutors arrive, harmoniously, at the thesis that puppets (normally 
emblems of determinism) are more capable of artistic expressiveness, grace, than human beings, because they 
are not hampered by painful human self-awareness (another Romantic commonplace, which also applies to the 
painfully self-conscious puppeteer in BEING JOHN MALKOVICH). What de Man objects to, is that the text as a 
whole is not structured as an argument, but is rather set up as a ‘scene of persuasion,’ in which an argument 
takes place. And he is quick to add that it is a rather dodgy argument in which a clear authority (Herr. C. the 
first dancer of the local opera) mystifies his interlocutor with bizarre stories the pertinence of which to the 
argument is anything but evident. 	

	
 The core of de Man’s argument is that commentators should pay mind to the means by which the the-
sis is arrived at within the story. For instance, just after Herr C. has told the story of the fencing bear, which was 
infallibly (miraculously) able to tell feint from thrust in a fencing match, the conversation proceeds as follows: 
“Do you believe this story, he asked. Absolutely, I replied with encouraging approval; it is plausible enough that I would 
have believed it had any stranger told, but it is even more plausible coming from you.”  (Kleist 26) This scene of per-
suasion that takes place in Kleist's text gains its plausibility partially from the fact that on the level of the staged 
events (between two dramatic characters, involved in an argument) there is the semblance of plausibility, even 
though from a distance the argument itself seems shaky, hardly worthy of credit. This strange connection bet-
ween a pleasant aesthetic experience (the mimesis of an interlocutor being persuaded by another) and the 
knowledge that therein is produced, opens up an awareness of the strength of the illusion mimesis creates.‑  xii
For de Man the work thus thematizes, through the tension in its formal structure, the ‘wavering status of narra-
tive, when compared to the epistemologically sound persuasion of proof.’ (Formalization 276) Thus, he measures 
the rigour of a text that dresses up as an argument to its own epistemological pretensions: those of a logical 
argument. 	

	
 In general this is true of de Man's method. He looks for a possible tension between the hermeneutics 
(an identifiable thesis) and the poetics (the structure, or procedure through which the thesis is reached). Nar-
rowing down to the mathematical pretensions of von Kleist's interlocutors he posits the following.	
!
In a computation or a mathematical proof, the meaning and the procedure by which it is reached, the hermeneu-
tics, if one wishes, and the poetics (as formal procedure considered independently of its semantic function), entire-
ly codetermine each other. But in another mode of cognition and of exposition, such as narrative, this mutual sup-
portiveness cannot be taken for granted, since it is not the only generative principle of the discourse. (ibid. 268)	
!
The important point to retain is that formalization refers to a degree (higher or lesser) of pertinence of the 
textual model; which is the combination of a truth claim (hermeneutics) and an aesthetic structure (poetics). In 
the case of the text of Kleist, de Man tries to show that the aesthetic structure is not able to sustain its purpor-
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ted meaning, or truth claim, which as such is destabilized.  The possibility of a hermeneutical interpretation, ba-
sed on unity between aesthetics and meaning, is as such problematized here.	
!
2.  Generative principle(s) 
In the previous paragraph we saw that de Man concluded that a narrative of persuasion, in contradistinction to 
logical proof, has more generative principles than just logical coherence. Still using the logical model as a con-
trast for the textual model of narrative, he puts one of those additional generative principles in high relief. This 
principle is mimesis – other principles mentioned are plausibility and exemplification. What he objects to in 
mimesis as a generative principle of discourse is that it produces the illusion that it replaces the sign with the 
referent. This mimetic illusion, de Man argues, governs the dramatic frame that is the basis of von Kleist’s text. It 
is at the highest diegetic highest level, in which the two gentlemen discuss puppetry. The dramatic language situ-
ation is created by explicit descriptions of their movements, the usage of direct discourse; indeed, at times the 
text reads as a theatrical script. The epistemological status – or in simpler words, the credibility of the truth 
claim of this text is then not determined by the internal self-sufficiency of argumentation (which would be Ga-
damer's presupposition), but by a semblance of plausibility, which in turn is produced partly by the success or 
failure of the mimesis of the dramatic situation. 	
!
Imitation, to the extent that it pretends to be natural, anthropologically justified to the point of defining the human 
species and spontaneous, is not formalized in the sense that mathematical language is; it is not entirely indepen-
dent of the particular content, or substance, of the entity it chooses to represent. “One can conceive of certain 
mimetic constants or even structures but, to the extent that they remain dependent on a reality principle that lies 
outside them, they resist formalization.” (Formalization 273-4)	
!
What this means for de Man is not that every text should strive for the highest degree of formalization possi-
ble. What it merely means is that its degree of formalization decides the transparency of its pretensions to 
truth. Take for instance his favored example of Baudelaire’s lyric. Of his poetry de Man asserts that the episte-
mological problems of mimesis are not at stake in lyric, because in there ‘the claim is that of a voice addressing 
entities or conceptually generalized expressions of particular entities.’ (ibid. 273) [emphasis mine, JK] In other words, 
lyrical poetry constructs a radically different language situation. Where Kleist's narrative tries to create a voice 
that inspires credibility and plausibility, and does so mimetically (by creating the illusion of a harmonious conver-
sation) lyrical poetry does something different, and its referential truth claims (i.e. mimesis) are not of interest, 
because there is not such a claim made by the lyric. What becomes clear, is that de Man does not hold an ex-
trinsic yardstick, to which a text has to live up, but rather that de Man gauges the epistemological claim of a text 
(that is – in normal diction – the answer to the question: “what knowledge does this text produce, and how is it 
related to its aesthetic/poetic/formal/structural dimensions such as the language situation?”), and tests the text 
to its own claim. This also qualifies his distrusting attitude (limiting it to a particular class of texts): he distrusts 
the production of credibility and plausibility: he is not necessarily a distrusting reader, but rather a distrusting 
reader of narrative.	
!
3. Conclusion 	

In summary, it is important to mark the distinction, in de Man's methodology, between the language situation, 
and his notion of the textual model. The language situation is the work's mode of address; this can be dramatic, 
lyrical, narrative, but also logical, or technically discursive: all of these have ramifications for its claim to knowled-
ge production, as we have seen above. Then there is the textual model, which is close to the claim to knowled-
ge production: it is defined by de Man as the "articulation of aesthetics and epistemology," or in a similar con-
ceptual couple: "poetics (procedure) and hermeneutics (meaning)" #REF() Language situation and textual mo-
del relate like address and interpretation. For Gadamer these are ideally the same. De Man makes a point of 
keeping them seperated. His criticism of Gadamer's model (exemplified by von Kleist's text) follows two stages: 
first he analyzes the tension within the text's entire language situation (narrative encapsulated in dramatic situa-
tion: three embedded anecdotes related by two interlocutors) in order to destabilize its claim to truth, know-
ledge or meaning. In the following chapter I will compare the textual model that de Man works with (in which 
the aesthetic structure works to disagree with the work's meaning), to that of Gadamer (in which there is unity 
between aesthetic and meaning), and work out some of its more philosophical consequences. 
!  Reference supplied: Schiller, Friedrich. On the Aesthetic Education of Man, in a Series of Letters, ed. and transl. by ix
Elizabeth M. Wilkinson and L.A. Willoughby (Oxford, Clarendon Press: 1967), p.300. De Man indicates that he has 
modified the translation of the quote.
!  Reference supplied: Ibid., pp. cxxxix
!  De Man’s usage of the word articulation (connoting both the expression of ideas, and the jointing of two (body) parts xi
, and disarticulation (with its connotation of violent dismemberment) is exemplary of the way in which he uses a word 
to resonate with its various meanings, whereas this ambiguity of the word and its different meanings (i.e. its tropologi-
cal movements), is a source of disarticulation of meaning, Gadamer finds that in the different usages of the verb ‘to 
play’ there can be found the essence of what it means ‘to play.’  The word articulation also suggest a naturalness of the 
joint: it is ostensibly not one that is created arbitrarily, but which has a definite function: a place within a functioning 
body, a system that can dance.
!  In my analysis of Being John Malkovich I will return to this important notion of the semblance of plausibility, bexii -
cause this film plays with scenes that in their formal aspects are recognizable as scenes of explication - quite common 
in Hollywood films, whereas what they make plausible is simply absurd. The tension this creates is crucial for my read-
ing of the film.
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4 Comparing Textual Models !
In this chapter I will compare the insights we can gain from the previous chapters, and we shall see that the 
metaphor of the puppet is particularly enlightening. For Gadamer, meaning is produced in an ideal aesthetic 
event - in which an audience takes part. The aesthetic event achieves a unity between poetics and hermeneu-
tics. The image of a functional system, in which every element serves its purpose comes to mind, de Man's no-
tion of articulation reflects interestingly here, because of its connotation with the body and limbs. In a sense the 
notion of unity between meaning and structure reflects a desire for a meaningful world about which it is possi-
ble to articulate truths in aesthetic structures meaningful. The subservience to function in Gadamer's concepti-
on of language is, comparable to an ideal conception of the human body, which makes itself entirely subservient 
to its role in the aesthetic performance. When Gadamer reflects on the task of the actor, it is an image of a 
puppet that comes to mind:	
!
Play itself is, rather, transformation of such a kind that the identity of the player does not continue to exist for anybody. 
Everybody asks instead what it is supposed to be, what is 'meant.' The players (or poets) no longer exist, but only 
what of theirs is played. (1979, 100)	
!
It is indeed as an emblem of perfect unity between structure and meaning that the puppet figures in the text of 
Kleist. The metaphor of the puppet functions as a symbol for aesthetic grace: the dancing puppet - in compari-
son to his human counterpart - has lost all manner of hesitation, painful self-consciousness. It is completely sub-
servient to the movements it has to perform, and as such an embodiment of Gadamer's ideal of total mediati-
on. This is where the greatest difference between de Man and Gadamer comes to the fore, and it can be ex-
plained by using de Man's conceptual pair articulation/disarticulation. The organic unity described above can be 
connected to what de Man calls the 'articulation between the aesthetic and the epistemological.' (Formalization 
267) Recapitulating in plain English: the one-on-one connection between a work's structure (it's style of phra-
sing, the storyline, the metaphors, etc…) and its meaning (the experience it seeks to convey). This notion of 
connection is tied in with the other two senses of the word articulation: first, its sense of clarity in communica-
tion, secondly, its transitive usage as a connection, deriving from the Latin diminutive for joint (dim.: articulus, 
from artus). This is how the puppet functions as a metaphor for organic unity (as a collection of neatly coopera-
ting limbs) and aesthetic unity at the same time in Kleist's text, and in the thesis that its protagonists appear (!) 
to defend. As we have seen in chapter 3 de Man reads this defense ironically; as an absurd thesis embedded by 
narrative, mimetic, and dramatic conventions. The result of this is that the plausibility is put into question, a pro-
cess which he calls disarticulation, or somewhat closer to the metaphor of organic, corporeal unity and quite 
morbidly: dismemberment. Besides being a metaphor for the perfect execution of a given role, the puppet is 
also a mere collection of limbs, loosely connected (articulated), with a tremendous freedom to make its own, 
surprising movements: it stands as a metaphor for the possibility of disarticulating a work's meaning, by pointing 
out the irreconcilable tension between the multiple possible interpretations, which we have seen in Chapter 
2/3 to be typical of De Man's mode of reading.	

	
 The puppet as such is a double-sided metaphor. One commentator on Kleist's Marionettentheater ma-
kes this duplicity very clear, and he frames his comment in the Romantic tension with Enlightenment, of free-
dom & nature, versus the deterministic mechanisms of cold rationality	
!
Presenting it as the position of Herr C., "On the Puppet Theater" ambiguously conjectures that the perfect unity of 
being, that is, the identity of freedom and nature, or the grace of the puppet, is achieved by mechanical means, i.e. by 
the loss of freedom. […] What the two characters in the essay ponder is how the dancer - or the actor - can achieve 
the effortlessness, the transparency of art. (Block 69-70) 	
!
Block tries to salvage Kleist, by saying that, really, the essay is about performances (and could be read as a Ga-
damerian theatrical metaphor, avant la lettre!). By determining what the work means (is it in fact an essay as 
Block decides, or is it, as de Man argues, a set of hardly coherent or related narratives, embedded in a dramati-
cal setting?) Block attempts to fix the work to a single position to which he allocates Kleist, now safely labelled 
an Enlightenment Romantic, 'that is, a Romantic aware of the issues and implications that Emmanuel Kant and the 
Enlightenment had for subsequent thought. […] In his non-fiction prose as well as his plays, Kleist often juxtaposes - 
and thereby creates almost irreconcilable tensions between - idealistic notions of freedom and a nightmare suspicion 
of determinism born of Enlightenment dreams of total, rational order. (ibid. 65) The difference with de Man would 
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be reducible to the insertion of the word 'almost.' De Man's reading of Kleist tries to play out tense elements 
against each other: on the one hand the puppet metaphorizes idealistic notions of aesthetic grace (in absolute 
unity between performance and meaning), and on the other there is the reading in which the puppet is a mere 
automaton, dead unless determined otherwise - by external forces. He seems to say that you cannot just wish 
away the unwanted implications of the puppet metaphor. By focusing on the unintended multiplicity of meaning 
de Man opposes the aesthetic of unity with an aesthetic of discord, which bases itself on a conception of langu-
age that is described by Laclau as figuring signification as material events, in which the expression 'unmediated 
reference' designates the unity of signifier (for instance, the puppet metaphor) and signified (in this example, 
aesthetic grace).	
!
"De Man had always insisted that any language, whether aesthetic or theoretical, is governed by the materiality of the 
signifier, by a rhetorical milieu that ultimately dissolves the illusion of any unmediated reference. (Laclau 229) 	
!
The materiality of the sign is a metaphor, because there is nothing literally material about it. What does it mean? 
It seems to connote the instability of matter, in its inherent transience. Whereas Gadamer sees the lingual sign 
as limited vis-a-vis the inexpressibility of the sense of our mortality - but valuable as the sole source of under-
standing we have, for de Man mortality is already inherent in the sign itself. Gadamer and de Man do not differ 
so much in terms of their awareness of historicity of text and the transience of interpretations, but Gadamer is 
a sort of adversary of death, whereas de Man is its reluctant companion, but on a different level: Gadamer is a 
philosopher, and his focus is thematic. He is interested in Eros/Thanatos, the big themes: how are these funda-
mental, universal aspects of the human experience manifested in literature?, how does human experience fixed 
in art transcend the life of its creator? De Man resists such an attempt to master death as inherently futile, as 
for him language contains the very mortality (the rejection of what is organic, alive, and in a sense, human) it 
tries to conquer. Literature is not the vessel for an immortal, human voice nobly facing death, because language 
is itself inhuman; outside of the scope of human instrumentality:	
!
The „inhuman” is not some kind of mystery, or some kind of secret; the inhuman is: linguistic structures, the play of 
linguistic tensions, linguistic events that occur, possibilities which are inherent in language - independently of any intent 
or any drive or any wish or any desire we might have…. If one speaks of the inhuman, the fundamental non-human 
character of language, one also speaks of the fundamental non-definition of the human as such. (qtd. in Johnson 219)	
!
I could not think of a stronger answer against the universality of Gadamer's humanistic claim, and indeed this 
quote gives us full view of de Man's distinct anti-humanism. Gadamer attempts to find a philosophical explana-
tion and definition that does justice to the phenomenon that language can give marvelous aesthetic experien-
ces, in which identification or recognition of a carefully articulated insight takes place. Using de Man's anti-hu-
manism this ideal of recognition suddenly strikes me as the mere self-congratulatory gesture of humanists that 
want to appropriate the beautiful as being an inalienable aspect of the shared humanity: paradoxically recogni-
zed solely by a hermeneutical elite of humans. Returning to the words of Schiller's commentators, 'the tautolo-
gy of art' does seem to suggest this self-congratulatory gesture of identifying oneself with the aesthetically plea-
sing, as the pinnacle of our common humanity. De Man counters this humanism with an anti-humanist aesthetic 
that emphasizes not unity, but discord, duplicity and disarticulation (and he would from upon this alliteration).	
!
Still, the interpretation of the enigmatic little text continues and, under the salutary influence of contemporary 
methodology, the readings have become increasingly formalized.  They allow one to reach the true aesthetic dixiii -
mension of the work, the uneasy mixture of affirmation and denial, of gracefulness and violence, of mystification 
and lucidity, of hoax and high seriousness, that characterized it and accounts for its enduring fascination. […] That 
this happens at the expense of stable and determinable meaning is a fair enough price to pay for the mastery over 
form. (Formalization 272)	
!
De Man's praise of the true aesthetic dimension of the text, is based on his claim to be happy to trade mastery 
of meaning, for mastery over form. But it is a trade that only goes one way: first there must be some mastery of 
the work's meaning, before a fruitful deconstructive analysis can be made. Going back and forth, between a 
desire for an aesthetic of unity, and the critical distance from this unity that follows from deconstruction, is the 
movement that is caused by the mise-en-abyme, but it is sustained by the desire for meaning only. Deconstruc-
tion as such, is a negative hermeneutics, a reaction: and in that sense it sustains what it dreams of destroying.	
!
!  De Man’s footnote refers to analyses of Marionettentheater by Helène Cixous, and H.M. Brown. (de Man 314)xiii
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5  Analysis of BEING JOHN MALKOVICH !
In this chapter I will analyse the film BEING JOHN MALKOVICH using the insights of Gadamer's hermeneutics and 
de Man's 'negative hermeneutics.' My analysis is structured as follows. The lead question is how the mise-en-
abyme functions in this work. This figure will require a short methodological introduction, which I will supply. It 
will be my claim that the mise-en-abyme is emblematic of the film's play with extending what I call hermeneutic 
promises, whilst actively preventing the fulfillment of these.	
!
1. Mise-en-abyme 
BEING JOHN MALKOVICH continuously emits signs that signify the possibility, a sort of promise, of unity between 
form and meaning. The emission of these signs bespeaks a desire for meaning, and this desire - being present in 
the first scene - frames the entire film. A rereading of the film puts this desire in ironical relief, but not to such 
an extent that one forgets the desire for meaning entirely. The willingness to read meaning, particularly through 
the mise-en-abyme, keeps the movement of the interpretive process in permanent suspension between the 
absurd and the articulated. As an emblem of this suspension stands the absurd portal into John Malkovich's 
consciousness, at the heart of this narrative.The notion of the mise-en-abyme finds its origin in a text by André 
Gide, who tentatively defines and evaluates the mise-en-abyme as follows.	
!
"In a work of art, I rather like to find thus transposed, at the level of the characters, the subject of the work itself. 
Nothing sheds more light on the work or displays the proportions more accurately." (Gide, qtd. in Dällenbach 7)	
!
From the perspective of  Gadamer, who wants the aesthetic structure to transmit universal experiences of hu-
man consciousness, it is very well possible that a small symbolic entity (such as a play within a play, or the pre-
sence of a manuscript within a book, etc…) represents the essence of the experience of human consciousness, 
for Gadamer indeed 'the subject of the work itself'.  As such, a symbolic relation inheres between the abyssal 
part and the whole, as between a concrete sign (i.e. within the diegesis) and an abstract referent: the thematic 
subject of the work is (as in Gide's definition of the mise-en-abyme) reflected on the level of the diegesis. In 
this view the ability of the mise-en-abyme to represent in a unified symbol the entire subject of the work ex-
tends a strong hermeneutical promise. This, however, is not the only interpretation of the word subject that can 
be given, as this transposition of the subject of the work of art, might refer to the thematic subject of the work, 
or, to the narrating subject, as Mieke Bal points out:	
!
Cette exploration révèle l'ambiguïté gidienne du mot sujet, qui se laisse interpréter comme le contenu thématique 
ou comme le sujet narrant.  (Bal 117)	
xiv!
Interpreting the word subject as 'narrating subject,' the transposition becomes a notion which is much closer to 
the deconstructive capacity of the self-conscious narrator. As such, it is a prime example of irony in de Man's 
framework. For de Man, irony works to signal the constructedness of language and as such maintains 'the radi-
cal difference that separates fiction from the world of empirical reality.' (de Man Temporality 217) De Man's 
assertion comes in the middle of a text in which he asserts the role of irony in countering the text's tendency 
to mystify its fictional nature. 	
!
Friedrich Schlegel knew this very well when he defined irony, in a note from 1797, as 'eine permanente 
Parekbase.' [reference supplied] Parabasis is understood here as what is called in English criticism the "self-conscious 
narrator," the author's intrusion that disrupts the fictional illusion." (ibid. 218-9)	
!
As becomes clear, the strongest example of irony for de Man is what is referred to as the 'transposition' of 'the 
subject  of the work' on 'the level of the characters,' in André Gide's coinage of the notion of mise-en-abyme, 
quoted above. Whereas in a great number of texts the transposition of the author on the level of the diegesis is 
a claim to a hermeneutic control of the artist over the articulated meaning of his unified artefact, there is a lot 
to be said for the option that rather than achieving such transcendence, the figure achieves its opposite: a radi-
cal irony cast on the fixity of the text's meaning, as the presence of the narrating subject emphasizes the fact of 
its narration, its construction - and thus its capacity for disarticulation.	
!
“Niet elk onderdeel leent zich daarvoor [lezing als mise en abyme, JK]. Je weet eigenlijk pas welk onderdeel rele-
vant is, wanneer je de gehele tekst hebt gelezen. Je kunt dan pas proberen deel en geheel aan elkaar te relateren. 
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Dat lukt nooit na één lezing , want elke herlezing leidt tot herziening. Zodoende ontstaat er een dialectisch proces. 
Wanneer je erin slaagt een betekenisvolle synthese te vinden tussen deel en geheel, stopt dat proces tijdelijk. 
Door deze dynamiek is mise en abyme in het Postmodernisme een populair vormgevend principe 
geworden.” (198) 	
xv!
In my analysis I will focus on how the three abyssal parts appear to extend a hermeneutical promise, which is 
disarticulated by the whole. In Korsten's terms, the film prevents the viewer from achieving the synthesis that 
the mise-en-abyme (as a figure in general) promises.	
!
2.  Three Abyssal Parts: Dance of Despair and Disillusionment 
It is not hard to read to read the opening scene as a mise-en-abyme. The opening credits coincide with the 
opening of the curtains of a puppet theatre. In this theatre a puppet performs a dance: a combination of cho-
reographed dance movements, and the aggressive destruction of the furniture within the room. The mirror in 
which the puppet steals a meaningful look at himself is shattered, and the puppet looks up - whether with des-
pair, anger, sadness we don't know - into the eyes of his master of strings, before sitting down in a corner, slum-
ping over his knees. This dance is repeated in exactly the same form, or choreography, by the body of John 
Malkovich which is under the control of Schwartz, (the puppet master of the first scene). This second time its is 
not a solitary performance in a puppeteer's workshop, but rather it is a mating ritual in a hotelroom shared 
with Craig's lover Maxine, who is duly impressed by Schwartz's measure of control over Malkovich. He tells her 
the dance is called "Dance of Despair and Disillusionment." This is what I refer to as the second instance of the 
mise-en-abyme. The pompous title returns as the title of a documentary about Malkovich/Schwartz's puppe-
teering career, which I read as the third instance of this mise-en-abyme.  My choice to do so is motivated by the 
return of that title, but additionally the opening scenes of the documentary (a performance within a perfor-
mance within a performance) feature images from a puppet dance which are strongly reminiscent of the first 
instance of the mise-en-abyme. The fact that the puppet in the first scene is a miniature of John Cusack (a 
transposition of the master of puppets), and the coincidence of the opening credits and the parting of the cur-
tains actively signal the scene as a miniature of the film, an embedded miniature performance. The exact repeti-
tion of the choreography reinforces the autonomy of this miniature performance, and the frame of Malkovich's 
television screen also seems to posit the "Dance of…" as an autonomous sign (a screen within a screen). These 
three instances single themselves out as parts reflecting on the whole. 	
!
Promise: Disarticulation of Articulate Meaning	

What does the mise-en-abyme appear to promise? Particularly the first scene seems to signal unified reading in 
the form of tragedy, in the most basic sense of the term, offered by Korsten: "a deterioration of a previously 
stable situation." (Korsten 28) We see a puppet, in his homely habitat, coming to a realization when looking in 
the mirror. This insight creates a terrible anger, which is only emphasized by the nearly convulsive intensity with 
which the master of strings is sweating and working when we see him from the puppet's perspective: the pup-
pet's desperate look is answered by a look of empathic understanding. The scene breathes hermeneutic promi-
se, strong human emotions countered with empathy, and the tragic redemption of the slumped puppet, after its 
beautiful dance has been completed. This sense of an invitation to read for tragedy fits nicely with Gadamer's 
insistence that the tragic (as well as the comic) are exemplary for the theatrical ontology of art. In reference to 
chapter 2 I recall here that for him recognition in the audience is crucial. I will look at how the film answers this 
Gadamerian requirement of recognition. So much for the hermeneutic promise of articulate meaning. Because 
in the second instance, the mise-en-abyme consciously thematizes the relationship between artist and artwork, 
and emphasizes the constructedness of the work. The fact that the puppet makes somersaults, in a choreograp-
hy which is impossible for a puppet (so constructed by digital means) seems to emphasize this point. In the fol-
lowing paragraph (§3) I will observe how the film's whole structure frustrates any attempt at a unified reading. 
Thus, my final reading of the mise-en-abyme (§4) centres on my observation that the figure works as a tragic 
lament of the deterioration of artistic sincerity in the two main protagonists: Schwartz and Malkovich.	
!!
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3. The Whole: Narratological Structure 
In this film there are several plot lines developing at the same time. The film can be read fairly straightforward 
as Craig Schwartz's tragedy, an unsuccessful puppeteer, who seizes the ultimate chance to become famous by 
appropriating John Malkovich's body, botches it, loses love and fame and suffers the painful consequences. A 
second reading emphasizes the tragedy of John Malkovich, playing himself, who struggles against the invasion of 
his consciousness by other individuals through a portal into his mind. He tragically loses his fight against a host 
of paying customers, Craig Schwartz, and finally dr. Lester ; the owner of the portal who ultimately seizes full 
control over his brain from Schwartz. The third complementary storyline is that of dr. Lester. He is in possession 
of all the secrets of the portal, and uses his knowledge to his own advantage. He awaits the right moment to 
strike, enters the portal, gains control of the host-body, and intends to repeat this trick into infinity. To the ex-
tent that he is successful where both Malkovich and Schwartz fail in their respective struggles we could think of 
the film as two tragedies and one comedy.  The pattern that appears in this observation is that the film features 
a number of protagonists, engaged in continuous antagonism with other protagonists. Although their individual 
storylines are continually interweaving with those of the others, these others are hardly anything more than 
helpers (borrowing from Mieke Bal’s narratological vocabulary) in the development of another protagonist’s 
struggle. An attempt to integrate all these story-lines into a comprehensive story, results in a rather bleak collec-
tion of wins and losses, of comic and tragic elements - without resulting in a meaningful tragedy or comedy in 
Gadamer's sense: there is no sense of recognition that film fosters. I would argue that this narrative structure 
reflects the rampant cynicism of the personal relations in the film. Already here, the puppetry theme is pervasi-
ve: everyone tries to manipulate everyone else in attempts to be, or to be with, John Malkovich. Craig Schwartz 
wants to control him like a real life puppet, Maxine takes shameless advantage of Craig's obsession for her, and 
capitalizes on his control of the portal with their enterprise J.M. Inc, and later on as John Malkovich's (or, Craig 
Schwartz's?) spouse, as she helps his career as puppeteer skyrocket. Dr. Lester keeps Maxine hostage to force 
Craig Schwartz out of the portal. All the while, John Malkovich (mostly as the mere shell of his body) is at the 
centre of the storm - for the greatest part unaware. 	
!
Whose Story Is This?	

This presence of the empty shell of John Malkovich at the center of a film whose title suggests that it is about 
the experience of "being John Malkovich" already signals the void which is at the heart of this film: the herme-
neutic promises that are made are all consciously left unfulfilled.  Whilst the mysterious portal has enormous 
potential, the film tells us virtually nothing about what it is like to be John Malkovich, and it seems to make a 
point out of it. The insights offered by the portal into Malkovich's private life show him choosing furniture from 
a catalogue, brushing his teeth, showering, and boringly rehearsing lines. The scene in which Malkovich himself 
enters his own portal might have offered some deep humanist insights, but instead it is a hilariously narcissistic 
nightmare inside a restaurant where each person wears Malkovich's head, and uses only one word: "Malkovich." 
In another scene, two women chase each other down the portal where they are shoved into Malkovich's sub-
conscious. What follows is a quick scan of Malkovich's childhood trauma's, a painful love experience, etc… 
However, this functions not as an attempt to gain insight in Malkovich - in a way which relates meaningfully to 
the events in the film - but merely as a backdrop for a chase scene of the two women. One of the most bizar-
re and original chase scenes iI have ever seen, it must be admitted, but nothing more hermeneutically satisfacto-
ry than that. In summary, Malkovich struggles against the invasion by Schwartz and later Lester, and he loses. But 
the film gives us little leverage to experience this tragedy as truly tragic or meaningful, because the absurdly 
banal scenes relating to the portal make it impossible to relate to the fate of Malkovich, which is laughable ra-
ther than tragic. 	

	
 There is a remarkable analogy between the two main protagonists: both are middling artists, whose 
seriousness exceeds their fame (although Malkovich is already a bit higher on Hollywood's ladder), but testifies 
to their artistic sincerity. Both characters thus extend a promise of depth: Schwartz as the desperate, but since-
re puppeteer: whose opening dance speaks of anger, disillusionment, strong passions, and whose art is geared 
not towards profit, because he chooses to 'raise issues.' Malkovich in his turn, is seen to practice Shakespeare 
lines, and rehearse these on stage as part of a Broadway theatre company. Malkovich is clearly on his way to 
fame, and soon this fame becomes the stepping stone for Schwartz, whose increasing control over Malkovich's 
body allows him to launch a puppeteering career, straight into the heart of Hollywood.  This appropriation of 
Malkovich's body signifies the flatness of both characters in a disillusioning way: Malkovich - although struggling - 
cannot prevent becoming an empty vessel, whilst Schwartz - in his new position of power - turns into the me-
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dia-gimmick he vowed never to become in one of the first scenes, in which he sees a successful puppeteer on 
the news, only to call him a 'gimmicky bastard.' Although his main drive seems to remain artistic - he pays for it 
at the expense of everything else: as a successful artist he turns out to be a cynical narcissist, whose marriage to 
Maxine is based on little more than his sexual obsession for her and her financial benefit from his technical con-
trol over Malkovich. 	

	
 When Dr. Lester finally coaxes Schwartz to release his control over Malkovich and the latter finds out 
that Maxine left him for his ex-wife Lotte (both turned lesbian), he desperately attempts to regain control of 
the portal, but ends up shutting himself away in the subconscious of the child of John Malkovich (to whose 
brain the portal has reverted - by some immutable law of the story - on the 44th birthday of Malkovich). The 
film ends with a scene of his solitary suffering: a restless point-of-view shot through the eyes of the girl, wat-
ching her parents, the two ex-lovers of Schwartz. We hear Schwartz, as a voice-over, imploring the girl to look 
away. He has been locked into the consciousness of the little girl, without any possibility of exerting control 
over the subject whose life he is suffered to witness. This tragicomic ending of near-Sisyphean proportions is 
kept from being truly tragic only by the absurdity of the (laws of the) portal, which bars the alienated viewer 
from identification.	
!
I think this is a film both wacky and profound. Would you believe, there is a hole in the wall, a “portal,” a long tunnel (a birth canal?) on the 
7½th floor (!) of a building and, if you crawl into it, there is suction and weird music, and you find yourself inside John Malkovich's head, seeing 
through his eyes and hearing through his ears. Then, after fifteen minutes, you are dumped out into a ditch alongside the New Jersey Turnpike. 
Give me a break! (Holland)	
!
Suspended Dis/ Articulation: The Absurd Portal 	

Before I come to my final reading of the mise-en-abyme I will argue that it is the mysterious portal, and the way 
it functions as a narrative device that obstructs both identification (Gadamer's requirement for a tragic reading) 
and more in general it obstructs meaning from becoming articulated. One could easily conceive of a herme-
neutic interpretation of this portal as a metaphor for the influence of others, of the invasion of the mind by 
external forces, ideas, or the acquired convictions that determine the course of a life.  What I mean in a more 
general sense is that a narrative device can be absurd, without hampering the progress of the narrative. It is 
exactly this capacity of narrative plausibility that leads de Man to analyse narrative in its capacity for mystificati-
on. In the case of BEING JOHN MALKOVICH however, I notice that the portal and its laws are made far too con-
crete, far to factual, to function as a plausibly absurd [oxymoron intended] narrative device. In short: its concre-
teness makes its absurdity painfully tangible. This becomes evident in the scene in which Dr. Lester explains to 
Lotte (Schwartz's girlfriend) how the portal  works. In this scene several cinematic narrative conventions are 
quoted to give the explanation quasi-scientific allure.  The scene supplies pictures of the portal, and dr. Lester xvi
cites literature on the topic to substantiate his explanation of the portal. It is on the authority of laughably sim-
plistic schematic images, and quasi-scientific discourse that the semblance of plausibility is created. This explana-
tion and the curiously understanding response of Lotte is strongly reminiscent of the interaction between the 
two interlocutors in von Kleist, cited in chapter 3, as part of de Man's analysis of the semblance of plausibility 
created in that text.	

	
 The portal, we learn, obeys to all sorts of laws: the host body is ripe at its 44th birthday, on that day it 
must be entered and submitted, because after that moment the portal reverts to a new host body. If this host 
body is entered in an early stage, the person entering it will be locked up into infinity in the host's subcon-
scious. As we have seen in the discussion of the narratological structure (§3), these 'laws' of the portal are cru-
cial for the proceeding of the story: the film's action culminates on the 44th birthday of John Malkovich, who is 
by then definitively colonized by a group of geriatrics led by dr. Lester who aim to continue their lives inside a 
younger body. As a result of these events Schwartz gets locked up in the subconscious of Malkovich's daughter. 
This is just to point out that the explanation scene is crucial for understanding the final events of the film. As 
such the portal is essential for the unfolding of the narrative; we can understand the final scene, because we 
have learned the laws of the portal. However, in terms of representational meaning, the scenes of explication 
just emphasizes the portal's absurdity and artificial constructedness (together with the fixity of its laws) and has 
an effect which is alienating rather than integrating. Whereas many films and narratives use devices that take 
part in the fantastic or absurd (cf. time travel in DONNIE DARKO, all of the magic in the HARRY POTTER series) 
without any consequence for their plausibility (as narrative!), this device has the effect of making the viewer 
aware of its very absurdity, because of the reasons I have stated: the attribution of immutable (but entirely arbi-
trary) laws to the portal, and the conscious parodying of Hollywood narrative conventions in the process. 	

 27
	
 This absurdity has a double effect: besides fixing attention on the artificiality of narrative in general, it 
cancels the hermeneutic promise extended by the tragic and comic elements in the film, by keeping the viewer 
away from a process of recognition, which is the basis of Gadamer's experience of the tragic. The absurd Sisy-
phean punishment caused in me a laughter which marks the opposite of recognition. In the case of John Malko-
vich, recognition of his fate is also rather difficult. While the film stages J.M. Inc's clientele's desire for identificati-
on - people cue up for fifteen minutes inside John Malkovich - it frustrates any desire for identification with 
Malkovich we - as viewers - might have. As a way of further emphasizing the point, there is a scene in the film, 
in which the psychologically troubled chimp of Schwartz's wife Lotte, transcends his childhood trauma by relea-
sing the bonds of Lotte who has been put inside the chimp's cage, bound and gagged. While she begs the mon-
key to undo her bonds, we witness - in stereotypically melodramatic fashion - how he revisits a memory of his 
parents trapped in the hunter's nets, summoning him (like Lotte) to release them in subtitled shrieks. So much 
for recognition and catharsis. In the concluding paragraph of this chapter I will argue that if we want to read 
BEING JOHN MALKOVICH as a tragedy (which I propose to do) it is as the abstract tragedy of artistic sincerity, 
which dwindles to cynicism in Schwartz and Malkovich.	
!
4. The Part: An allegorical reading of the mise-en-abyme 
Whereas one can observe this play with the frustration of a unified reading (which hampers a hermeneutic as 
well as a deconstructionist approach), the film also explicitly parodies an aesthetic which is remarkably Gada-
merian - as was already clear from the chimp's catharsis in the previous paragraph. I will discuss two examples, 
which occur in the third instance of the mise-en-abyme: the documentary entitled "Dance of Despair and Disil-
lusionment." In it we witness Malkovich, now completely under Schwartz's sway, as he instructs puppeteering 
novices in his art. 	
!
(Documentary voice over): Malkovich's rise to fame brought about a Renaissance in the art of puppeteering.	
!
[cuts to auditorium with a puppeteer on stage, Malkovich/Schwartz is among the audience]	
!
(Malkovich/Schwartz to pupil):  No no no no. What are you doing?	

(pupil): I'm making him weep, John.	

(Malkovich:/Schwartz): You're making him weep but you yourself are not weeping. Don't ever […] with your audience. 
Until the … the puppet becomes an extension of you, it's a novelty act.	
!
What becomes prominent here is Malkovich/Schwartz's endorsement of an aesthetic which demands the 
submission of the player to the performance, which we encountered in Gadamer (cf. chapter 2 §1). On the 
other hand, the words 'Renaissance' and 'novelty act' can be interpreted ironically. because the documentary 
shows us exactly how the puppetry hausse is nothing but a temporary hype in which all of Hollywood sudden-
ly begins to dabble in puppetry, in order to have a share of Malkovich's fame. This becomes very clear in the 
cameo appearance of Sean Penn (acting as himself), who ironically declares - with a badly concealed smirk on 
his face - to consider a move into puppeteering near-inevitable.  Or consider the following eulogy of Malko-
vich's work by critic Christopher Bing (an uncredited performance by David Fincher), which clearly parodies 
Gadamer's universal humanist discourse (cf. chapter 2 §2) for a second time.	
!
(Christopher Bing): Malkovich shows us … a reflection of ourselves, our frailties, and our , you know, desperate huma-
nity. That's what makes him one of the most relevant artists of our time.	
!
What we see is that besides making a hermeneutical reading impossible (prevention of tragic recognition, ironic 
destabilization of narrative devices, narratological structure which does not integrate into one meaningful who-
le) this very hermeneutical approach is explicitly thematized and ridiculed in the third manifestation of the 
mise-en-abyme (the documentary named Dance of Despair and Disillusionment). What about the first and 
second Dance. can I somehow integrate my reading? 	

	
 I would argue that Gadamer's aesthetic is used as a nostalgic lure in the first scene, in which the first 
abyssal Dance takes place. We encounter Schwartz, a seemingly sincere puppeteer, who works very hard in his 
workshop with themes of despair, sadness, destructive anger. The scene stages a (dance) performance within 
the performance (of the film itself) and as such seems to invite a meaningful transposition of terms in which the 
meaning of this scene is transposed to stand for the meaning of the film as a whole. An attempt at this would 
direct us to the tragic struggle of the Dance's protagonist (with despair and sadness, etc…); a lifelike copy of 
Craig Schwartz. This struggle, as we have seen, takes place in the remainder of the film, but the cynical flatness 
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of Schwartz's character, and moreover the abundance of different elements which add to the experience of the 
film, prevent us from reading the first scene as a transposition of the meaning of the film as a whole. By the 
time we encounter the choreography of the first scene for a second time, and hear Malkovich/Schwartz decla-
re with pompousness that its title is "Dance of Despair and Disillusionment" any notion of his artistic sincerity 
has dwindled to the recognition of his cynical manipulations. The second Dance is nothing but a (successful) 
attempt at impressing his lover with his technical prowess as the puppeteer of a living body.  This dwindling of 
his artistic sincerity coincides with the submission of Malkovich's body, who first appears in the film as a sincere, 
albeit slightly boring, Broadway actor, rehearsing Shakespeare lines. If I would have to come, finally, to an integra-
ted reading of these three abyssal scenes, I would ask (inspired by Gadamer): who is the protagonist of the tra-
gedy that the film's opening Dance seems to signal? The answer is that the mise-en-abyme signals an abstract 
tragedy, that incorporates the two incomplete tragedies of Schwartz and Malkovich. Contrary to those two 
incomplete tragedies (for they offer no recognition, or catharsis), the tragedy I have in mind is one that I can 
relate to in the sense that qualifies Gadamer's notion of tragedy. The mise-en-abyme laments the decline of 
artistic sincerity, by showing how Schwartz and Malkovich's apparently sincere artistic intentions are figuratively 
and literally hollowed out: respectively by the manipulative drive in Schwartz, and the colonization of Malko-
vich's body. Of course this lament is not without irony. because of the way in which it reflects on the film's ma-
kers own sincerity. Furthermore, the conscious parodying of Gadamer's aesthetic prevents any attribution of 
nostalgia for a romantic aesthetic of unity to the film. What I think the work signals - and this, is the limit of this 
thesis, and the subject of another - a desire that Lee Konstantinou terms postironical. He identifies this desire in 
the wider cultural movement called the New Sincerity, which seeks to move through postmodern irony and 
doubt, towards a renewed artistic sincerity.  Just across the scope of this thesis I offer Konstaninou's horizon:	
!
By postirony, I mean the use of metafictional or postmodernist (usually narrative) techniques in the pursuit of what 
amounts to the pursuit of humanistic or traditional themes:  the desire to "really connect" to other people, the project 
of cultivating sincerity, the wish to move beyond systems-level analysis of the world toward an analysis of character, the 
new centrality of "narrative" and "storytelling" in experimental works. 	
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
!  "This exploration [Dällenbach's text on Gide's mise-en-abyme, JK] reveals the Gidean ambiguity of the word subxiv -
ject which allows itself to be interpreted as the thematic content, or the narrating subject of the work."
!  See note 1 for translation.xv
!  The film makes several such gestures. Lester Corp., dr. Lesters firm of which Schwartz is an employee, is located on xvi
a half floor, which is crammed in between two floors of an office building. On his first day, Schwartz is sat down in 
front of a TV-screen on which an introduction video is played which explains the origin of this remarkable office. This 
short video abounds in parodies of historical documentary. According to this 'mockumentary' the founder of the office 
building is a captain, speaking in archaic English (which gives the video a hilarious fake historic ring), who - out of 
piety for a 1 meter high woman's  complaint that all buildings are constructed to suit the needs of tall people - com-
missions a half floor to be constructed in his new office building.
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 Conclusion 
!
In this conclusion I will begin with a reflection on my own reading process ('what kept me enticed?'), before 
briefly summarizing my insights and observations. I will argue with van Alphen's critical vocabulary, that the af-
fective strength of this film is its outright refusal to facilitate any sort of allegorical reading with which I have just 
- with such apparent comfort - rounded off my analysis. In his article, "Affective Operations of Art and Literatu-
re," he calls such an allegorical reading, "a transposition of terms" in reference to Attridge's critical dismissal of 
such a mode of reading (van Alphen 26).  Attridge's argument is that many modes of reading are allegorical, in 
that they transpose a selection of signs from a work to a different context. As a classic example of a work 
which emphatically invites such a reading one could think of George Orwell's Animal Farm, which is normally 
read as an allegory for the Russian revolution. This would be a historical allegory: the work's meaning is made 
whole and unified by transposition into a historical context. A different type of transposition would be to read 
the work of art in the context of an abstract notion of the human condition. Whereas de Man is on the one 
end of the allegorical spectrum reading for the text's secret ideological nature, Gadamer is reading for the uni-
versal human condition on the other end. Both are working from the hermeneutical stepping stone that 'the 
point of an art-work is to say something.' (Attridge 37)	

	
 Attridge observes that both these modes of reading have their merits, but cannot be used in all cases. 
He opposes allegorical reading with literal reading. 'What I am calling a literal reading is one that is grounded (sic) 
the experience of reading as an event.' (Attridge 39) The differences with de Man and Gadamer are smaller than 
Attridge makes them appear - for he contrasts his method explicitly with de Man's deconstruction, and implicit-
ly with the allegorical humanism of Gadamer's hermeneutics. Gadamer also works with a performative notion 
of the artwork as theatrical event. Their difference is that Gadamer believes in the transmission of a universal 
humanistic message (however difficult to interpret) which only aesthetic structures are fit to perform. De Man, 
as we have seen, also works with the notion of the sign as (material) event to underline his position that no 
sign can mean the same thing exactly twice, because in time meanings will change. The difference resides in de 
Man's strategy to read every text as an allegory for the interpretive difficulties it creates (as we have seen in 
the example of von Kleist's text).  What is innovative - or at the very least, useful - about Attridge's approach is 
that it shifts the question from what the text is trying to say, to what it is trying to do. Van Alphen singles out 
this useful aspect of Attridge's work (my citation begins with a citation within a citation):	
!
	
 It (cq: reading, JK) is an experience I can repeat, though each repetition turns out to be a different 	
 	
 	

	
 experience and therefore, a new singularity, as well. (Attridge, 39)	
!
Such a "literal" reading, or what I would like to call affective reading, not only deals with the text (or the image) in a 
different way, but also deals with more textual elements. (van Alphen 27)	
!
It is exactly this challenge posed by BEING JOHN MALKOVICH, that helps me to move from an attempt to integra-
te all the disparate 'textual elements' of the film into one interpretation, to an acceptance that the film does 
something to me, without necessarily allowing of the unification of a disparate collection of signs into one mise-
en-abyme.	
!
1. An affective reading of BEING JOHN MALKOVICH 
Whereas Attridge and van Alphen are discussing approaches of artworks, I intend to turn their arguments 
around and argue that it is part of BEING JOHN MALKOVICH's structure that it frustrates any hermeneutic, whilst 
inviting an affective approach. It is exactly such a reading that is given by Norman Holland.	
!
Screenwriter Charlie Kaufman and director Spike Jonze have been insanely inventive in making this film. And they have 
even, I think, been profound. Yet this mix of wackiness and profundity creates a problem for critics, and not just me. I 
find it terribly hard to see this film as a unified work of art because it goes off in so many weird directions. That's the 
astonishing inventiveness of it. (Holland)	
!
What the affective strength of this work did to me is lure me in with the promise of a mise-en-abyme: an intri-
cate connection between three separate, though somehow related scenes. This intuited relation aroused my 
curiosity, a fascination that -luckily- lasted. It extends the promise of what Gadamer thinks of as an ideal unity 
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between structure and meaning. What ensues is the dialectical movement, back and forth, as described in Kor-
sten's definition of the mise-en-abyme between one's understanding of the part and of the whole. The mise-
en-abyme is in general a figure which propels this movement between knowing that there is a sign, and not 
knowing yet what it means, until the movement lessens into a temporary suspension of reading. In the case of 
BEING JOHN MALKOVICH, my reading of the mise-en-abyme as signaling the abstract tragedy of the film's depic-
tion of the deterioration of artistic sincerity is - for me - a satisfactory ending point of my thesis, a suspension of 
the reading process. Nevertheless it is only in full view of the realization that in arriving at this allegorical rea-
ding, it is not about the allegory, but rather about the reading process itself. 	
!
A hasty flight to (allegorical) meaning can only end up in the already known, in the recognition of conventional mea-
nings, whereas the affective operations and the way they shock to thought are what opens a space for the not yet 
known.  (van Alphen 30)	
!
What, in conclusion, I have come to appreciate about the film, is Holland's 'mix of wackiness and profundity,' The 
promise of depth and its absolute shallowness, which results in an extension of the reading process until this 
very moment, in which -still- the disquieting feeling of a very incomplete reading ('allegorical reading […] has to 
leave out a lot in order to be efficient' (ibid. 30)) will not subside.	
!
2. A Matter of Asking the Right Question 
What helped me in coming to grips with the interpretive difficulties and the affective force exerted by it was 
framing the differences between Gadamer and de Man in terms of the different questions their methods allow 
me to ask. De Man's aesthetic of affirmation and denial, and his attempt to deconstruct the textual model's 
articulation between poetics and hermeneutics, make his questioning suspicious. He asks of a text, or of any 
other artwork: "what sort of a truth claim does this text make?" His questioning proceeds to find an aspect in 
the formal structure of the work that is somehow at odds with this claim, to show that the text deconstructs 
itself. Often this oddity is found in the work's particular language situation - as was the case in his analysis of 
Kleist's Marionettentheater. The deconstructive analysis of the formal structure of the work - including its parti-
cular language situation - is extremely useful, but only to the extent that some claim is made. De Man's method 
works particularly well on the texts that Gadamer's aesthetic describes, a text that strives for a close unity bet-
ween structure and meaning. It is against the enticement of such a unity that de Man's method works as potent 
antidote. However, in my analysis of BEING JOHN MALKOVICH I ran into the trouble of not being able to substan-
tiate my intuition that the film made any claim to unified meaning - and still, after almost a year of thinking 
through this film, it does not feel quite substantial. I came to the limits of de Man's framework, because the film 
yields little to no answer to the question: "what claim does this text (film) make?"	

	
 Gadamer's trust in aesthetic unity allows him to approach the text differently. "What is this text trying 
to tell me?" The relation between text and addressee is one of a communication between peers, a transmission 
of human experience, through aesthetic means. Initially, coming from an academic background in which the cri-
tical postmodern insights of the text's ideological opacity and differential poststructuralist thinking (dominated 
by de Man's own Yale School) have taken firm ground, it feels slightly uncomfortable to work with Gadamer's 
aesthetic philosophy. It is not hard to shove him aside as an elitist, naive aesthetician, who is out of touch with 
what has happened in the arts and criticism since the end of modernism. But I would have done him a great 
injustice if I would have staged his insights simply to shove them aside on those grounds; as a straw man for a 
deconstructive analysis. I did not start reading him as a mere foil for de Man - whose methodology I am far 
more comfortable with.  I started reading up on hermeneutics, because of my first intuition that something in-
teresting would come from a hermeneutical analysis of the mise-en-abyme in BEING JOHN MALKOVICH - the 
dialectical, hermeneutical movement implied by Korstens definition of this figure (cf. "Introduction" of this thesis) 
strengthened me in this resolve. If trying to answer Gadamer's trusting question entails an uncritical appreciati-
on of the aesthetic experience that a work gives me as member of the audience, then I would soon have star-
ted to feel uncomfortable indeed. But BEING JOHN MALKOVICH is not a film that allows the viewer to wallow in 
an aesthetic experience of unity between structure and meaning. Quite the opposite, the film - even after long 
analysis - gives me the feeling of expressly creating a continuous disjunction between the structure and any sta-
ble meaning. There are many disparate modes of reading the film - as a reflection on stardom, as an ode to 
puppetry, as the meaning of John Malkovich's life, or that of Craig Schwartz, the desire for immortality, or simply 
as an absurd thought experiment- but the film's many ironies keep it from making any substantial claim on 
which a deconstructive analysis would hinge. Whilst I was already not even expecting it to make a single unified 
claim, it somehow succeeds at voiding each and every claim, each possible reading. Asking the question, with 
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some good faith, "what is this film trying to tell me?" has been most productive at this impasse. It has allowed 
me to start thinking about the structural void at the heart of this film, and how this void is itself capable of pro-
ducing meaning. At this junction it has helped me to think of this through the notion of affect, because the nar-
rative void exerted such a strong appeal on me, even though my familiar critical paradigm (deconstruction) did 
not yield anything the film did not already flaunt.	
!
3. Conclusion  
I have finally come to a reading of BEING JOHN MALKOVICH as a collection of semantic promises that the film 
actively prevents to fulfill. The mise-en-abyme, being a very particular form of such a promise, stands as a prime 
example of this. Its three steps (the three Dances) show first the ostentatious artistic sincerity of Craig 
Schwartz which reflects a Gadamerian desire for aesthetic unity.The hotelroom scene shows how this sincere 
desire is perverted into a complete instrumental submission of the body of Malkovich, and the third mise-en-
abyme reflects ironically on how exactly this act of appropriation leads to the fame of John Malkovich as a pup-
peteer, a career move which is eulogized as the Renaissance of puppetry - with strong humanist repercussions. 
Thus, the mise-en-abyme shows in a very concise manner the way in which the film makes semantic promises, 
deconstructs them through irony, leaving the reader of the film suspended between the absurd and the articu-
lated, without having done a claim to truth. As such both the modes of analysis of Gadamer and de Man are 
simultaneously invited and incapacitated, which forces me, as a critic, to strike a middle ground between the 
two approaches. I was led to van Alphen's notion of affective reading, because it acknowledges reading as an 
event, which is not necessarily reducible to the meaning arrived at in the eventual act of interpretation. 	

	
 As such I acknowledged that the event of viewing and interpreting BEING JOHN MALKOVICH signals 
more than just the 'wavering epistemological status of narrative;' it's playful zero-claim aesthetic creates a void 
in which any meaning eventually disappears. The affective force of this is that it kept me, as a nosy literary critic, 
propelled by the promise of an allegorical transposition of signs, looking for a definitive answer. By extending its 
semantic promise, whilst detaining its fulfillment, it made the desire for meaning tangible in me as a reader, pre-
cisely because the desire is never fulfilled. To achieve a suspension of the endless movement between part and 
whole, it helped to ask the question, with Gadamer's hermeneutics focus in mind: "whose tragedy is this?" In 
answer to this I observed that inside the hollow eulogy of Malkovich/Schwartz's 'desperate humanity' hides an 
elegy for a deceased artistic sincerity. And it is exactly this abstract allegory for the loss of artistic sincerity, which 
allows me as a reader to finally, but still temporarily, suspend the reading process and transpose this disparate 
collection of signs into the context of wider cultural reflection on artistic sincerity. Naturally this answer only 
begs more questions, which I cannot begin to answer here. The first and foremost of these questions, which I 
would like to leave here as a recommendation for further research is the question of how this reading reflects 
on Kaufman and Jonze's own artistic sincerity, and I think that their other work (particularly Adaptation and 
Synecdoche, NY) provides fertile ground for such further questioning.	
!! !!
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